What the Factory Couldn’t Fix

Sheertex is gone. Insolvency, then an asset sale. I owned target COGS/CTP while I was there from 2019 to 2024. I wrote a victory lap when I left. The factory was real. It could make a pair of pantyhose for about the right cost. But that wasn’t enough. That victory needed an asterisk.

The original sin: it’s easier if people pay more for better. Commodities are tricky. Apparel even trickier. Unbreakable tights had to cost what tights cost.

The second sin: paid acquisition. Selling below cost to prove demand, to justify scaling it. ‘nuff said.

My sin: I built a massive scaling machine on the backs of those two. A quarter billion dollars of capital to push cost down toward what customers would actually pay. It worked, in the direction it could work: the factory got built, cost per pair fell hard. Every ounce of automation was required. More still was required. Cheaper-at-scale got us close. But the win was small - we got to sell way better pantyhose for the price people already paid…

Was it a noble use of the money and the years? That was never my call. My call was to spend it well, and I think I did ***. Both things are true: I did the best factory work of my life, and the company it was for died.

*** Money I’m fairly sure I didn’t spend well

• Certain consultants & experts
• Gel before stretching
• Plastics recycling & coatings (though I swear I tried not to invest in them)
• Building the factory in Quebec
• Not building the pilot plant sooner / durably
• Custom headless ecom site x2 / in-house data team & infra
• Not firing a few people I should have / allowing hiring to be outsourced
• Not forcing a cultural rail: industrial-first or brand-first or liability-first